American Anthropology and Company by Murray, Stephen O.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
University of Nebraska Press -- Sample Books 
and Chapters University of Nebraska Press 
Spring 2013 
American Anthropology and Company 
Stephen O. Murray 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/unpresssamples 
Murray, Stephen O., "American Anthropology and Company" (2013). University of Nebraska Press -- 
Sample Books and Chapters. 194. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/unpresssamples/194 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Nebraska Press at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Nebraska Press 
-- Sample Books and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
AM E RI CAN ANTH ROPOLOGY & C O M PANY
Buy the Book
Critical Studies in the 
History of Anthropology
SERIES EDITORS
Regna Darnell
Stephen O. Murray
Buy the Book
American 
Anthropology 
& Company
Historical Explorations
Stephen O. Murray
University of Nebraska Press 
Lincoln and London
Buy the Book
© 2013 by the Board of Regents of the University 
of Nebraska. All rights reserved. Manufactured in 
the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Murray, Stephen O. (1950–)
American anthropology and company : historical 
explorations / Stephen O. Murray.
pages cm. — (Critical studies in the history of 
anthropology)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8032-4395-8 (cloth : alk. paper)   
1. Anthropology—United States—History.  
2. Anthropological linguistics—United States—
History. 3. Sociology—United States—History.   
I. Title. 
GN17.3.U6M87 2013
301.0973—dc23  2012050027
Set in Lyon Text by Laura Wellington.
Buy the Book
In memory of
Robert A. Nisbet (1913–1986)
and Dell H. Hymes (1927–2009),
mentors of vast erudition,
who crossed disciplinary borders 
with impunity
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
 Contents
  List of Illustrations ix
  Series Editor’s Introduction xi
  Introduction xv
PART 1:  Anthropology and Some of Its Companions
  INTRODUCTION: Before the Boasians 3
 1.  Historical Inferences from Ethnohistorical Data:  
Boasian Views 15
 2.  The Manufacture of Linguistic Structure 22
 3.  Margaret Mead and the Professional Unpopularity  
of Popularizers 31
 4.  American Anthropologists Discover Peasants 52
 5.  The Non-eclipse of Americanist Anthropology  
during the 1930s and 1940s 88
 6.  The Pre-Freudian Georges Devereux, the Post-Freudian 
Alfred Kroeber, and Mohave Sexuality 102
 7.  University of California, Berkeley, Anthropology  
during the 1950s 114
 8.  American Anthropologists Looking through Taiwan to See 
“Traditional” China, 1950–1990, with Keelung Hong 122
PART 2:  Sociology’s Increasingly Uneasy Relations with Anthropology
  INTRODUCTION 157
 9.  W. I. Thomas, Behaviorist Ethnologist 161
Buy the Book
 10.  The Postmaturity of Sociolinguistics: Edward Sapir  
and Personality Studies in the Chicago Department  
of Sociology 172
 11.  The Reception of Anthropological Work in American 
Sociology, 1921–1951 194
 12.  The Rights of Research Assistants and the Rhetoric of 
Political Suppression: Morton Grodzins and the  
University of California Japanese-American Evacuation  
and Resettlement Study 211
 13.  Resistance to Sociology at Berkeley 246
 14.  Does Editing Core Anthropology and Sociology Journals 
Increase Citations to the Editor? 264
  Conclusion: Doing History of Anthropology 273
  Acknowledgments 289
  Notes 295
  References 317
  Index 363
Buy the Book
 Illustrations
 TABLES
 1.  Areal distribution of articles in American Anthropologist, 
American Ethnologist, and Man/Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 97
 2.  Berkeley Anthropology Department faculty of 1950 119
 3. Berkeley anthropology doctoral dissertations, 1950–
1962 120
 4.  Country(ies) listed in titles of books and articles reporting 
research on Taiwan by American-trained anthropologists,  
by institution of PhD training 142
 5.  Taiwanese visibility by topic in publications of American-
trained anthropologists 144
 6.  Number of articles by some leading anthropologists and of 
reviews in the American Anthropologist and core American 
sociology journals, 1913–1950 175
 7.  Chicago student enrollment in Sapir and Ogburn courses, 
1925–1932 190
 8.  Citations to selected faculty in University of Chicago 
sociology PhD dissertations, 1920–1935 192
 9.  Reviewers of three or more anthropology books in the 
leading American sociology journals, 1921–1951 198
 10.  Journal editors’ citations during and after editing core 
journals 266
 11.  Editors of core anthropology and sociology journals, 1958–
1998 267
Buy the Book
FIGURES
 1.  Percentage of citations to editors in the journal  
edited, 1956–1998 268
 2.  Mean annual citations of sociology editors in  
journal edited, 1958–1999 269
 3.  Mean citations of sociology journal editors by  
year of office, 1958–1999 270
Buy the Book
xi
Series Editor’s Introduction
REGNA DARNELL
I have known Steve Murray since he was a University of Toronto sociol-
ogy graduate student starting a network analysis of anthropological lin-
guists. From research on anthropological linguists and linguistics—which 
culminated in his magisterial 1994 book Theory Groups and the Study of 
Language in North America—and without any institutional support, he 
branched out to examining other borders of academic anthropology, 
including the obvious one for a sociologist, sociology, plus (ethno)his-
tory, as well as psychological anthropology (in its “culture and person-
ality” guise). Very few readers are familiar with the full disciplinary range 
of his work. Most of the papers published in this volume have appeared 
in earlier forms in print, directed to diverse audiences. It seems to me 
that his method and argument define a unique critical perspective on 
anthropology as institutionalized for the past century and a quarter in 
North America. Reflexive bookends at the beginning and end motivate 
the choice of papers and integrate Murray’s preoccupations over his ca-
reer. Few other historians of anthropology have written broadly enough 
on the subject for a career perspective to emerge.
 Several of the chapters of this book look at histories of central institu-
tions of American anthropology, including its core journals and geo-
graphical expansion. Familiar, canonized anthropologist “culture heroes” 
(Sapir, Kroeber, Lowie, Mead, Boas, Redfield) indeed appear, but they 
are juxtaposed with the likes of William F. Ogburn and W. I. Thomas, 
leading figures of American sociology whose history was interwoven 
with that of anthropology at least until the end of the Second World War. 
Murray unravels much of the tension behind disciplinary coexistence 
at major institutions, particularly the Universities of Chicago and Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. At Chicago, an anthropology department split off from 
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its august sociology department. At Berkeley, the anthropologists, par-
ticularly Alfred Kroeber, effectively opposed the emergence of a depart-
ment of sociology and relegated the work of demographer Dorothy 
Swaine Thomas to agricultural economics (thereby also excluding her 
from histories of sociology, though she was the first female president of 
the American Sociological Society).
 Murray brings critical distance to the emergence of peasant studies 
as a rebellion against Boasian Native American salvage research; he fore-
grounds the sociological side of anthropology that attempted to move 
beyond the isolationism of North America in the interwar years. Murray 
is inclined to attribute the contemporary approach to urban anthropol-
ogy and the ethnography of complex societies to Chicago sociologists 
rather than to the anthropologists in their midst and clearly shares a dis-
taste he reports sociologists had for the pronouncements about “Amer-
ican culture” of 1940s anthropologists who had done little or no research 
on their own “home” society and culture. Questions of political suppres-
sion arise, for example, in the analysis of anthropologists’ complicity in 
World War II Japanese internment and with the long-running martial 
law on Taiwan by the Kuomintang, purporting to be “the Republic of 
China.” The history of anthropology and associated disciplines does not 
emerge as uniformly benign, and Murray’s work challenges contempo-
rary anthropologists to evaluate where they have come from as part of 
present practice.
 Murray consults archival sources for professional correspondence and 
the published literature of articles and reviews for cues to anthropolo-
gists’ networks and frames them in terms of institutional developments 
and cultural trends that were far from unique to anthropology. He is a 
tenacious archivist, following individuals and events from institution to 
institution and integrating widely dispersed sources. Trained as a soci-
ologist, he counts things that can be counted—then tells his readers why 
the numbers explain what people were up to (citations, numbers of stu-
dents, book reviews, etc.). He elicited memories and explanations from 
elders of the “tribes” (disciplines) who are now dead and triangulates 
these “native views” with archival records and published social science 
literature.
 Murray is skeptical of the stories anthropologists tell about themselves 
for an audience within the discipline and seeks out alternative explana-
tions and connections, particularly at disciplinary connecting points 
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where cross-fertilization is most likely to occur. He has a way of getting 
to the point and challenging readers to disagree, but only on the basis 
of historicist interpretation of concrete evidence. Sloppy generalizations 
about the history of anthropology annoy him and often stimulate him 
to undertake research complicating pat explanations.
 In addition to ethnological analysis and theorizing, Murray has done 
(and published in refereed journals) ethnographic work in Latin Amer-
ica and Asia as well as North America, giving his voice an all-too-rare 
comparative ethnographer resonance. He deploys his insider-outsider 
status in anthropology to approach the preconceptions the anthropolo-
gist takes to the field in his collaboration with Keelung Hong on the lat-
ter’s native Taiwan and emphasizes the explicit challenges this 
perspective poses to established anthropological wisdom. Questions are 
raised at the peripheries that tend to be glossed over at the center. This 
collection is provocative and needs to be taken seriously as both sub-
stantive historiography and methodological caveat for a critical history 
of anthropology.
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
xv
Introduction
Collecting some of my writings about research on the history of Ameri-
can anthropology and its social science neighbors (history, linguistics, 
psychology, and at greatest length, sociology) provides the opportunity 
to reflect on how they came about and to see some relationships between 
a range of research projects aiming to answer questions about some 
things that happened and some that did not but seemingly could have 
along the relatively unfortified borders of twentieth-century American 
anthropologies.
 Having had no undergraduate sociology or anthropology course but 
having read books about scientific communities by Herbert Butterfield 
and Don Price, I wandered into the history of social science stimulated 
by Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which I 
read in 1972, during the summer after I graduated from college. At the 
University of Arizona two years later, Keith Basso stimulated my inter-
est in social influences on language use. When my sociologist mentor 
Robert Nisbet told me he was leaving Arizona and that I needed to find 
a different PhD program, I migrated to the University of Toronto, in-
tending to do dissertation research about power in spoken interaction, 
building on the work we did in Keith’s seminar.
 William Samarin took over my education about sociolinguistics, and 
I picked up some ideas about ethnohistory from him as well. The sum-
mer after my first year in graduate school I attended my first annual 
meeting of the American Sociological Association—at which I heard 
some very unimpressive presentations by many of the biggest names in 
the field. However, I also went to a sociology of science session in which 
I heard a paper by Nicholas C. Mullins (published in 1975) that provided 
the model of revolution-making in science that I would test and refine 
in my doctoral dissertation and one by Harriet Zuckerman (1974, never 
published, though the main example for it was, as Zuckerman and Led-
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erberg 1986) about how lines of work can be postmature as well as pre-
mature, which bore fruits especially evident in chapters 10 and 12 of this 
volume.
 I proposed a dissertation testing the bipartite (functionalist and con-
flict) Mullins model of group formation and rhetorics of continuity or of 
making revolutions. I quickly realized that context-free measures of the 
amount of discontinuity in practices or in theories did not exist and would 
be essentially contested were any proposed, whereas intercoder reli-
ability about proclaiming continuity or revolution was obtainable. What 
I proposed eventually became American Sociolinguistics (Murray 1998), 
but the dissertation reached beyond anthropological linguistics to un-
anthropological linguistics (the purported “Chomskian revolution” in 
particular: see Murray 1980d) and back through centuries of North Amer-
ican work describing and attempting to explain language(s): what be-
came Theory Groups in the Study of Language in North America (Murray 
1994b).
 The case studies (including theorizing that did not lead to “theory 
groups”) contained a lot of detail, but were being deployed to test Mul-
lins’s model. I have included none of this line of work here. Indeed, only 
two chapters in this collection (2 and 10) deal with linguistic anthropol-
ogy. Both focus on Edward Sapir’s years (1925–31) in the University of 
Chicago Department of Sociology (of which an anthropology program 
was a junior partner before becoming a separate department in 1929). I 
feel that as a linguistic anthropologist (which I sometimes think I am) I 
am in the Sapir tradition, but am aware that I would probably not have 
gotten along with him had I been his student or colleague. I feel that op-
portunities for interdisciplinary integration were missed at Chicago of 
the late 1920s (for which there is plenty of blame to go around!) and that 
Sapir was the person there with the knowledge about languages to sup-
plement Chicago sociologists’ experiences doing ethnography.
 I also think that anthropological research on peasantries by American 
anthropologists was late, if not fully “postmature.” When it was done, it 
was done primarily by students of Robert Redfield at Chicago and those 
who had studied with Alfred Kroeber at Berkeley. This turn is explicable 
in expanding the subject matter as the supply of “tribal”/“primitive” 
people was rapidly waning. Kroeber supervised and encouraged work 
on peasants, though his own ethnographic work was “salvage anthro-
pology” of severely disrupted California indigenous groups, along with 
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archaeology in Peru and analysis of cultural changes over centuries with-
in large-scale civilizations.
 It is difficult not to notice that anthropologists and sociologists who 
were trained at Berkeley and Chicago loom large and recurrently in my 
historical explorations (along with those, including Kroeber, Robert Low-
ie, Margaret Mead, and Sapir, who had been influenced by Franz Boas 
at Columbia, plus Columbia sociology PhDs such as William Ogburn 
and Elsie Clews Parsons). In part this focus on those sites is because 
they were important centers for social science research and theorizing. 
In part, it is that so much biographical work has been done on Columbia 
faculty and graduates that I did not see much point in undertaking re-
search on them. Probably another part of the explanation is that very 
rich archives exist at the Bancroft Library (Berkeley) and the Regenstein 
Library (Chicago). I have spent a lot of time in both libraries, along with 
a week’s time spent in the Boas Collection of the American Philosophi-
cal Society Library in Philadelphia.
 Kroeber and Sapir play major roles in the stories told in several chap-
ters, as do W. I. Thomas and his wife, Dorothy Swaine Thomas (who was 
already named Thomas before marrying him). I see tragic elements in 
the career (and inept careerism) of Edward Sapir. I see W. I. Thomas as 
something of a martyr who refused to consider himself a victim—Doro-
thy Thomas as a tragic heroine who also refused to consider herself a 
victim. The final two Berkeley-centered chapters can be read as cases 
of ingratitude by young and ambitious men (Morton Grodzins and Rob-
ert Nisbet) to accomplished and senior scholars whose sex made them 
vulnerable to marginalization (Dorothy Thomas and Margaret Hodgen).
 I am not pushing a particular theory (about sexism, theory-group for-
mation, or anything else) in the studies collected here. Most of my re-
search projects were stimulated by doubts about particular claims. 
(Taking examples other than the historical ones examined in this vol-
ume, I was skeptical about the use of weak ties in getting job informa-
tion or that interruption is a male monopoly in naturally occurring 
speech.) I think most of the chapters show that developments in (social) 
science are fitful and far more complicated than simpleminded “just-
so” stories like those Derek Freeman and others have told. Zadie Smith 
wrote that “most of us have complicated back stories, messy histories, 
multiple narratives” (2009:42), and so do scientific “schools,” theories, 
and methods. Kuhn (1962 and elsewhere) considered social sciences 
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“preparadigmatic” because of dissensus about such basic matters, though 
I have my doubts about any paradigm commanding the assent of every 
credentialed participant in any modern scientific field. I am interested 
in developments in anthropology and other fields but very skeptical of 
Development (or Evolution) in the singular. My dissertation research 
convinced me that there are both major continuities across the punc-
tuations of “scientific revolutions” as well as major discontinuities with-
in “normal science.” Moreover, “normal science” (and, indeed, all 
academic disciplines) is often very rancorous, and even seemingly he-
gemonic theory groups are riven with internal controversies and per-
sonal antagonisms, though these may be cloaked in rationalizations of 
methodology and interpretations of doctrine and data.
 Labels—even those such as “Boasian,” “Freudian,” or “Parsonian,” 
which I sometimes use—often obscure nearly as much as they illumi-
nate. I think that at least some of my work, especially the first four or 
five chapters in this volume, looks at practices, which to me include re-
current omissions as well as recurrent commissions in what social sci-
ence practitioners do or did. Having entered the field looking at network 
clusters rather than genealogies, I wish that history of social science 
writing focused more on practices, less on pronouncements about af-
filiations to theoretical paradigms and apostolic successions.
 Insofar as cultural anthropologists, linguists, and sociologists are “pro-
fessionals,” their “profession” is as “professors,” not as researchers or 
writers living on fees for service and royalties.1 Professors often seem 
more interested in professing to colleagues away from their institution-
al bases—whether in person or in keyboarding and subsequent publica-
tion—than to students at the university. When I speak of their 
“practices,” this includes what they do inside their discipline (and sub-
specialty) more than what they do within a particular university or oth-
er institution. Jockeying for place and for quasi-ownership of particular 
research domains (places or topics) is a focus of many of these historical 
explorations. From my dissertation research on anthropological linguis-
tics, my curiosity carried me from that borderland into unanthropolog-
ical linguistics (see Murray 1994b) and unlinguistic anthropology (most 
of the chapters herein).
 My first interest in Boasian anthropology was stimulated by Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, who was in the French sociological tradition of Émile Dur-
kheim (and, especially, Durkheim’s nephew and collaborator, Marcel 
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Mauss), as well as in the comparative social theorizing of Charles de 
Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I’ve been tempted to include 
my first presentation at a professional meeting, “Lévi-Strauss in the State 
of Nature” (presented in El Paso at what was then called the Rocky Moun-
tain Social Science Association), an honest-to-God structuralist analysis 
of the “states of nature” in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, Rousseau’s So-
cial Contract, and Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques (and some articles by 
him).
 My undergraduate background in social theory (in the ornately named 
major “Justice, Morality, and Constitutional Democracy” at James Mad-
ison College) allowed me to do well in the “pretest” that Robert Nisbet 
gave students on the first day of his social theory class. Nisbet had writ-
ten two books on Durkheim and found my approach (through Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, and Durkheim) at least interesting. So, although my re-
search on the history of anthropology followed interest in anthropolog-
ical linguistics, that interest itself flowed from the French tradition of 
theorizing about society/ies.
 I’ve already mentioned that I had no undergraduate sociology (or an-
thropology) courses, but I had read some Max Weber (not least, “Sci-
ence as a Vocation”) and was intrigued by the Weberian base of 
Berkeley sociologist Jerome Skolnick’s (1967) police ethnography Justice 
without Trial. Weber is not viewed by as many anthropologists as hav-
ing done ethnology as Durkheim, particularly in his last (1910) book, is 
seen as an ancestor of symbolic anthropology and (in earlier work) as a 
pioneer of structural analysis and of analysis of phenomena such as sui-
cide with social variables. Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life (1912) was (among other things) an ethnology of Australian aborig-
ines. Weber’s life project was comparative, comparing material on reli-
gions and economies; drawing data from historical texts and archival 
material along very long historical durées, Durkheim used then-recent 
ethnographies by others in Elementary Forms and official statistics in Le 
suicide (1897). I was once accused of being a “closet Weberian” but don’t 
think that my comparativist interests were ever closeted. The compara-
tivism among American social science traditions may not seem obvi-
ously Weberian, but in examining multiplicities rather than proclaiming 
a singular evolutionary trajectory, I feel that what I do is Weberian more 
than Durkheimian (or Marxist). I do not see the history of sociocultural 
research as teleological, progressing even unsmoothly to one ultimate 
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Truth (explanatory principle). Anyone seeking a teleological history can 
find it in Marvin Harris’s The Rise of Anthropological Theory (1968), which 
definitely does not focus on practice(s).
 This personal contextualization is included to establish that although 
my path into or toward sociocultural anthropology was through linguis-
tic anthropology, once I arrived there, I had some relevant background. 
As a historian, I approached the anthropology-sociology border from 
anthropology, having approached sociocultural anthropology from lin-
guistic anthropology and linguistic anthropology from the Durkheimi-
an/Lévi-Strauss tradition. Perhaps my idiosyncratic peregrinations 
through social science disciplines did not matter to how I interviewed 
those with memories of the events and/or scholars in whom I came to 
be interested or how I worked through archival collections. I certainly 
learned some things about interpreting texts from my undergraduate 
(Justice, Morality, and Constitutional Democracy) and graduate (soci-
ology and linguistic anthropology) classes and did some (Weber-influ-
enced) content analysis in a social psychology methods course taught 
by William Crano at Michigan State. Part of my disillusion with the Ar-
izona sociology program was the unconcern about data gathering I felt 
was prevalent there: the focus, particularly from Otis Dudley Duncan—
my academic genealogy link to Ogburn—was on grinding quantitative 
data gathered by others; only a decade later did I find out that Duncan 
shared some of my concerns about the validity of the numbers he taught 
us to grind (Duncan 1984).
 It might seem more-or-less natural that a sociologist who undertook 
research on anthropologists would take an interest in the sociology- 
anthropology border regions and that it was from having been a post-
doctoral fellow in the Berkeley anthropology department that I would 
take an interest in earlier interdisciplinary projects and conflicts at Berke-
ley. Prefiguring an argument I will make in the conclusion, such “com-
monsense” inferences are misleading. It is from having been a student 
of Robert Nisbet’s at Arizona that I explored the fate of the peculiar de-
partment in which he had been a student and junior faculty member. 
Similarly, my interest in the professional unpopularity of scientists who 
do popularizing work (chapter 3) came in part through Brandeis (where 
I’ve never been, but where Everett Hughes influenced some people who 
influenced me), in part through having lived in the Arizona-Sonora des-
ert with connections through whom I reached and talked to Edward and 
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Rosamond Spicer, and in part from one of the theory groups of my dis-
sertation research having been ethnoscience (see Murray 1982). On the 
other hand, despite my grounding in Freudian conceptions from under-
graduate courses, the chapter (6) focusing on Freudian anthropology 
developed while I was in Berkeley, supposed to be working on linguistic 
anthropology, but having easy access to George Devereux’s PhD disser-
tation on Mohave sexuality. If I didn’t live in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
I might not have undertaken to write about Berkeley anthropology dur-
ing the 1950s (that decade I chose because it seems less written about 
than earlier or later ones there). It was also while I was a Berkeley post-
doc that Keelung Hong directed my attention at anthropological (mis)
representations of Taiwan (chapter 8), including but not confined to 
Berkeley ones, with less-compromised work from people at my first alma 
mater, Michigan State (of whom I had been unaware when I was there).
Topics of Particular Chapters
The chapters within each of the two sections of this book are roughly in 
chronological order. The expanse of time covered in some of them makes 
for some temporal backtracking, however.
 Divergences among “Boasians” are foci of the first and third chapters. 
I think that these chapters are concerned with practices in research and 
inference more than in theorizing. (I see Boas as antitheoretical, though 
many of his students were not, including Edward Sapir, a major charac-
ter in the second chapter, one particularly focused on practices and how 
field practices and assumptions about a singular structure being recov-
erable from any speaker affected the descriptions and analyses produced.)
 As the “salvage” project of American(ist) anthropology waned, some 
anthropologists got around to studying peasant communities. (Sociolo-
gists had been doing both rural and urban community studies for some 
time, though the 1930s was a “boom time” for community studies in 
sociology as well as in anthropology.) Anthropologists trained by Kroe-
ber and Lowie at Berkeley were among the anthropologist pioneers of 
peasant studies (along with those trained at Chicago by Robert Redfield 
and A. Radcliffe-Brown), as is elaborated in chapter 4.
 Chapter 5 shows that a geographic expansion of interest beyond U.S. 
territory was more gradual and less complete than some have suggested. 
In addition to expansion of geographic range, increased attention was 
paid to enculturation in early life, attention encouraged by Freudian as-
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sertions about character structures being set in infancy and early child-
hood. In chapter 6 I look at the dissertation and predissertation fieldwork 
and training by Kroeber and Lowie of Georges Devereux, who became 
one of the most orthodox of Freudian anthropologists but was, I show, 
not one yet at the time of his Berkeley dissertation on the Mohaves.
 Chapter 3 is unusually focused on a center of American anthropology 
research and training (Columbia/Barnard/New York’s Museum of Nat-
ural History) rather than on anthropology borderlands (linguistic, psy-
choanalytic, or sociological). Its aim to correct the misrepresentations 
of the culture of Boasian anthropologists in Derek Freeman’s shoddy, 
surmise-heavy “history” of American anthropology is obvious. Chapter 
7 looks at a major department, the University of California at Berkeley’s, 
which was somewhat becalmed during the 1950s with the retirements 
of its internationally known anthropologist superstars. This is the same 
department from which the psychological anthropology work discussed 
in the sixth chapter emerged (during its heyday) and one that reappears 
in chapter 13 as leading resistance to establishing a sociology department.
 Chapter 8 turns to another periphery: doing fieldwork on Taiwan while 
American social scientists were banned from China and pretending to 
be studying “traditional Chinese culture,” a more prestigious line of 
work than researching a hybrid culture under autocratic rule (that justi-
fied itself as restoring “traditional Chinese culture” to what had been a 
Japanese colony). We (the chapter was coauthored with Keelung Hong) 
show that there was variation by topical domain in how invisible in an-
thropologists’ representations it was that the research was done on Tai-
wan. (The past tense is justified since American anthropologists fled 
democratizing Taiwan to work under the auspices of the autocrats in 
China once they could.)
 Chapter 5 does not have a geographical base in terms of a particular 
anthropology department but looks at the field more generally in regard 
to field site locations. Although some American anthropologists looked 
beyond aboriginal America(s), looking at publication data shows that 
American anthropologist remained “Americanist” in the usual sense of 
American cultures and field sites.2
 The ninth chapter shows that the pioneering empirical sociologist W. 
I. Thomas began as a Boasian ethnologist and ended as a behaviorist, 
although he has been read primarily as a voluntarist sociologist, espe-
cially by symbolic interactionist sociologists. (I do not think that he is 
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read at all by twenty-first-century anthropologists, though some may 
nod at his pioneering collection of life histories from Polish emigrants 
to the United States.)
 The tenth chapter focuses even more than the second one did on Ed-
ward Sapir, again in his Chicago years (1925–31), and the failure of eth-
nography of speaking or any other kind of sociolinguists developing there 
and then. Though Sapir was brought in to bridge disciplinary boundar-
ies, he was involved in the fission of the sociology department at Chi-
cago into separate sociology and anthropology ones, and his strongest 
personal bond to a Chicago sociologist was to the least ethnographic of 
them, William F. Ogburn (who had been friends with Boasian anthro-
pologists at Columbia and was data-oriented but was not interested in 
language).
 The eleventh chapter—looking at the reception of anthropological 
books in the three core American sociology journals—shows that cul-
tural anthropology was highly valued by American sociologists until pro-
nouncements by Margaret Mead, Hortense Powdermaker, and Clyde 
Kluckhohn made sociologists wonder whether what anthropologists un-
derstood of distant/alien societies was as off-base (invalid) as the facile 
claims they made about “American culture” (and the inner workings of 
Hollywood).
 The thirteenth chapter, like the tenth, examines a case of postmatu-
rity. Although anthropologists were not the sole opposition to the Uni-
versity of California (Berkeley) establishing a sociology department, 
Kroeber in particular was involved in delaying establishment of one. 
Keeping Dorothy Swaine Thomas—wife of W. I., student of and collab-
orator with William F. Ogburn, and later the first female president of the 
American Sociological Association—marginalized in the Department 
of Agricultural Economics seems to have been a major motivation, not 
only for senior male scholars in other disciplines but also for Margaret 
Hodgen, pioneer of history of anthropology, who was the woman head-
ing the Department of Social Institutions. That department was an ad 
hoc institutional home concocted for her mentor, Frederick J. Teggart, 
who retired in 1940 and died in 1946.
 The twelfth chapter also shows Dorothy Thomas being kicked around, 
by both an ambitious former research assistant and by senior staff at 
the University of Chicago who she thought would understand her want-
ing to control research for hire done by a research assistant, Morton 
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Grodzins. The subject matter of the data (the forced removal of Japa-
nese Americans from the U.S. West Coast) and some artful dodging of 
truth made it possible for Grodzins to publish project data . . . and to 
take the position of his primary Chicago advocate as head of the Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, despite having no other background in pub-
lishing than getting his PhD dissertation published over the vociferous 
opposition of his former supervisors—including his dissertation super-
visor, Charles Aikin, and Thomas, who was on his PhD committee in 
addition to being the head of the Japanese-American Evacuation and 
Resettlement Study (JAERS).
 As with many of the preceding chapters, the final substantive one aims 
to correct misapprehension, this one that editors of core anthropology 
and/or sociology journals profit by increased citation of their work in 
the journals they edit.
 The concluding chapter reviews what I believe I have learned from 
doing history of social science: a set of maxims rather than a cookbook. 
I think that understanding past thinkers as they understood themselves 
is ultimately impossible but nonetheless is a worthy aspiration, which 
is to say I consider my work “historicist.” I do not think that trying to 
figure out what people in the past thought they were doing disallows 
criticism of how they did—and failed to do—what they wanted to do. 
Moreover, I find deplorable some of the goals—notably herein those of 
the anthropologists who worked for concentration camp administrators 
(as the Berkeley Japanese-American Evacuation and Resettlement Study 
staff did not) and those eager for access to fields in Taiwan—and do not 
confine myself to observing the self-defeating conduct of social scien-
tists. My research and analysis of the history of American social science(s) 
is primarily internalist,3 but by no means would I proscribe externalist 
work, particularly of the World War II and Cold War work into which 
some anthropologists plunged enthusiastically (garnering much more 
financial support than British functionalists received from the British 
colonial establishment), which David Price (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2008) 
has been exploring (see also Solovey 2001; D. Wax 2008). George Lucas 
(2009) extends such valuable inquiry into this century’s combats.
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Before the Boasians
Though the chapters in this book do not form a teleology or test any spe-
cific theory, some readers might find the particular topics addressed as 
beginning in medias res and/or readers may lack background in the pre-
history of academic American anthropology—a process that began in 
the last years of the nineteenth century. In addition to recommending 
accounts in Bieder (1986), Bieder and Tax (1974), Darnell (1998a, 1999, 
2001), Hinsley (1981), and Jacknis (2002), I provide a whirlwind over-
view below.
 From the beginning of European settlement of the Americas, mis-
sionaries tried to learn about Native American cultures and languages. 
Proselytizing in native languages and translating the Bible into them 
was an early and persisting commitment, along with understanding Oth-
ers the better to manipulate them (“applied anthropology” après la lettre). 
Many Christians were interested in scrutinizing the native people to see 
if they were some “lost tribe of Israel” (Hodgen 1964:303–25; Stocking 
1968:42–68). Rationalists during the eighteenth century also sought in-
formation about the native inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere to 
build and assess models of “the state of nature.”
Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson was an American rationalist with wide-ranging inter-
ests. Prior to his election as president of the United States of America, 
he worked on problems of Native American philology and speculated 
about where Native people(s) came from. As president, he promoted the 
collection of information on Native Peoples, especially through the (Meri-
wether) Lewis and (William) Clark expedition to the Pacific coast (1803–
6). Jefferson himself prepared a research memorandum for them and 
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stressed the need to record languages and cultural traits. In his Notes on 
the State of Virginia of 1787, Jefferson set forth his own speculations about 
the ancestry of the American Indian(s), tabulated historical, descriptive, 
and statistical data on tribal groups, and reported on his own excavation 
of burial mounds.
 In frequent correspondence with leading European and American in-
tellectuals of his time, he “and others of his circle set an example by ac-
cumulating new knowledge regarding Homo Americanus. This was 
anthropology without a portfolio, pursued in our own frontiers” (Hal-
lowell 1960:16).
 Since Jefferson extended those frontiers, he also had less disinterest-
ed motivation for learning about the indigenous peoples. In his view, 
their cultures deserved respect. In the view of others, Native people were 
savages who happened to be in the way of what was later claimed to be 
the “manifest destiny” to supplant them with God’s chosen northern 
European people (Anglo-Saxons) across North America. Once the new 
American government committed itself to the principle of recognizing 
native title to western lands, “it was of great practical importance for 
the government to have reliable knowledge about the Western tribes” 
(Hallowell 1960:18). Jefferson’s own curiosity certainly extended be-
yond the practical needs of presiding over territorial expansion, but his 
wider humanistic motivations for inquiry were not necessarily shared 
by his successors, nor did they determine his presidential policies (see 
Wallace 2001). Jefferson institutionalized a connection between anthro-
pological/linguistic inquiry, territorial expansion, and a responsibility 
for managing Native people within that encroachment.
Gallatin, Schoolcraft, and the American Ethnological Society
Together with Thomas Jefferson, whose secretary of the treasury and 
advisor on Indian affairs he was, Albert Gallatin (1761–1849) was one 
of the leading American Enlightenment figures. However, Gallatin “did 
not undertake serious ethnological studies until the 1820s, a time when 
Enlightenment assumptions about man were under attack” and Ger-
man romanticism was increasingly influential (Bieder 1986:17).
 Gallatin participated in the cultural, intellectual, and social institu-
tions of the New York elite in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
John Bartlett, a fellow officer in the New York Historical Society, pro-
posed to him “a new society, the attention of which should be devoted 
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to Geography, Archeology, Philology and inquiries generally connected 
with the human race” (quoted in Bieder and Tax 1976:12). Gallatin was 
elected president of the new American Ethnological Society (AES) in 
1842. Its dinner meetings were held in his home until his death in 1849. 
“The active members tended to be gentlemen of some social standing 
in the New York community who knew each other well, and while they 
had some intellectual pretensions, they were not ‘ethnological experts.’ 
Nearly all were professional men. . . . Very few of the members, even in 
the early and more fruitful years of the AES had any ethnological expe-
rience” (Bieder and Tax 1974:16).
 Through most of the nineteenth century, “descriptions [of native ways] 
were often interpreted by gentlemen and philosophers who themselves 
had not had contact with native peoples. . . . This period gave way to one 
of incipient professionalism in which individuals labeled their work as 
anthropology and submitted it to evaluation by their peers, but were not 
themselves trained as anthropologists” (Darnell 1976:70–71).
 Rather than develop (evolve) toward professionalism, the AES foun-
dered (degenerated). Its sponsor died, leaving only dilettantes behind. 
Also, “philosophical disagreements had an adverse effect on the Soci-
ety’s fortunes. Many members quarreled about what was pertinent and 
legitimate for discussion. The crux of the matter lay in the fundamental 
division between the atheistic polygenists . . . and the clerics. . . . As phys-
ical anthropology became a topic of common discussion in the Society, 
discord erupted. The polygenist approach to physical anthropology dis-
turbed both the clergy and other monogenist members, many of whom 
were mainly interested in Near Eastern antiquities and insisted on a lit-
eral interpretation of the Bible” (Bieder and Tax 1976:17).
 That is, the AES was split by “paradigm conflict” despite its “presci-
entific” status. The Bible served as a paradigm for the monogenists, who 
explained diversity as stemming from degeneration (due to the lapsing 
of God’s law) from the original unity of descendants of Adam and Eve.1 
Those who believed in multiple origins of humanity, language, and cul-
tures necessarily challenged the sufficiency of Genesis as a description 
and/or explanation (Hodgen 1964:225–94).
 Gallatin argued that Indian languages were primitive against those 
who saw “polysynthetic” languages as residues of a higher ancestral civ-
ilization (usually assumed to be that of a “lost tribe of Israel”). Mayan, 
Aztec, and Inca civilizations, which Gallatin insisted were indigenous, 
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demonstrated the racial capacity to advance to urban, agriculture- and 
state-based civilization.
 Henry Schoolcraft, now better remembered as the white discoverer 
and namer of the source of the Mississippi River (Lake Itasca, compound-
ed from veritas caput) than as an expert on North American Native Peo-
ples, was a geologist on an 1820 government expedition to Lake 
Superior and the Mississippi River led by governor/general Lewis Cass. 
In 1822 Schoolcraft was appointed Indian agent at Sault Saint Marie, 
Michigan. There he married Jane Johnson, an Ojibwa woman of mixed 
descent. Though spending more time in the field than most early eth-
nographers, Schoolcraft was typical in underacknowledged reliance upon 
the “tacit knowledge” of a long-term local resident (see Ogden 2011). 
Schoolcraft was less optimistic about Native Americans’ racial capacity 
than Gallatin had been, often considering them “Oriental,” which to 
him meant impervious to change, though he nevertheless believed the 
young could be Christianized and educated. Cass, a patron of School-
craft and of others studying Native Americans,2 thought that Gallatin 
and others romantically overestimated the capacities of American In-
dians (see Cass 1826). Schoolcraft found—to his chagrin—that a “prim-
itive language” (specifically Ojibwa, then called “Chippewa”) was not 
as simple to master as Cass’s theory of limited mental capacity of Indi-
ans ordained.
 Frustrated by the difficulty of linguistic analysis, specifically with dem-
onstrating the connections between Ojibwa and Hebrew, and by per-
sonal circumstances, Schoolcraft sought another, easier “royal road” to 
Native American history than comparative philology in folkloristics (Bie-
der 1986:158–173; Hallowell 1960:43). Despite the increasing dominance 
of polygenism (Horsman 1975), which made inroads even in the AES, 
Schoolcraft maintained the “Genesis paradigm.”
 Both by being innatist in science and by articulately criticizing geno-
cidal policies, Schoolcraft and, later, Lewis Henry Morgan continued 
the Gallatin tradition, both in monogenist theory and in the practice of 
defending Native Americans from rationalizations for genocide. Indeed, 
his major ethnographic and ethnohistorical study of the League of the 
Iroquois was originally a series of “Letters on the Iroquois Addressed to 
Albert Gallatin” published in the American Whig Review in 1844–45. Al-
though Schoolcraft and Morgan did extensive (if not intensive) fieldwork 
with particular peoples (Chipewyans and Iroquois, respectively), and 
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although all three collated published reports and questionnaires sent to 
those familiar with different North American peoples (“tribes”), they 
all treated American Indians as a single people at the stage of “barba-
rism” in the evolutionary rise from “savagism” to “barbarism” to “civi-
lization” (see Hodgen 1964). All three defended the model of 
monogenesis against an increasingly dominant polygenism in which 
American Indians were considered a distinct species doomed to extinc-
tion in competition for territory with the “Anglo-Saxon race.”
Brinton and Putnam at Pennsylvania and Harvard
A firm believer in the psychic unity of mankind, Daniel Garrison Brin-
ton, a Philadelphia physician, was active in many local intellectual so-
cieties. I would include among the local organizations Philadelphia’s 
American Philosophical Society, of which Brinton was president in 1869 
and in the Proceedings of which he published many anthropological pa-
pers. Brinton was also president of the (more truly national) American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in 1882.
 Brinton was “technically the first university professor of anthropol-
ogy in North America,” appointed at the University of Pennsylvania in 
1884. However, the appointment was an honorary one without salary. 
Moreover, Brinton did not actually teach classes or have students at the 
university (Darnell 1970:82, 85). The grandiose structure of courses list-
ed in university catalogs went mostly untaught for lack of students. At 
least, he trained no professional anthropologists (A. Kroeber 1939:178, 
1960:4–5). He was “committed to the development of an academic frame-
work for anthropology” (Darnell 1970:83) but was at odds with the local 
patrons of the university and museum, who were primarily interested 
in classical and Near Eastern antiquities. Reacting against “lost tribes 
of Israel” and other interpretations of superficial resemblances, espe-
cially in myths and especially across vast spaces, Brinton maintained 
the probability of independent invention. Brinton’s work had little post-
humous influence (A. Kroeber 1960:4), except as the unnamed object 
of some of Boas’s polemics between 1896 and 1911—though Boas was 
certainly not seeking to renew grand schemes of diffusion such as those 
Brinton had combated.
 Frederic Ward Putnam came closer to being an organizational leader 
than Brinton did. Putnam was trained between 1857 and 1864 as a zo-
ologist by Louis Agassiz, the preeminent natural historian in the West-
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ern Hemisphere. Putnam joined the Peabody Museum of American 
Archaeology in 1870 and held an honorific chair at Harvard similar to 
Brinton’s at Pennsylvania between 1886 and his death in 1908. Putnam 
was not a Darwinian nor a Spencerian in any strict sense, albeit he was 
considerably more of one than was his patron Agassiz or his protégé 
Franz Boas. He “shared the prejudices and views of his contemporaries, 
although his commitment to a long historical perspective was tied to an 
advocacy of contact and borrowing more than in the case of his evolu-
tionist contemporaries” (Timothy Thoresen:author, June 13, 1977).
 As permanent secretary of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, Putnam had national ties in the world of science. His 
old New England family connections provided him access to the world 
of private philanthropy (Stocking 1968:279). Unlike Brinton, Putnam 
organized several enduring anthropological institutions, including the 
anthropological work for the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago 
in 1893, which became the Field Museum, and for the American Muse-
um of Natural History in New York (1894). He was also the nominal head 
of anthropological enterprises at the University of California beginning 
in 1900, although ill health kept him on the East Coast (A. Kroeber 1905). 
The Peabody Museum apparently did not pay him enough to live on, 
and he refused to give up his position there, but he could not realisti-
cally superintend day-to-day functioning of three institutions in three 
different cities. This overextension provided an opportunity for his pro-
tégés—Franz Boas in New York and Alfred Kroeber in California (see 
Thoresen 1975; Dexter 1989). Under their guidance, Columbia Univer-
sity and the University of California at Berkeley became two of the three 
preeminent institutions for training anthropologists in the twentieth 
century.
 During the 1890s anthropology at Harvard produced fifteen PhDs—
more than any other institution in the country. Following in the tradition 
established by Putnam, they were as a group predominantly interested 
in archaeology, without strong commitment to any major viewpoint in 
anthropological theory (Stocking 1968:279).
 Putnam had no particular theory to push. Even in archaeology, where 
his own focus was, he did not found anything identifiable as a “theory 
group,” nor did he provide distinctive intellectual leadership of the sort 
to found one. Even his importance as an organizational leader probably 
looms greater in retrospect because Boas and Kroeber, themselves im-
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portant intellectual and organizational leaders, were among those Put-
nam sponsored and because archaeology continued at Harvard. He 
worked a number of years to place Boas and backed Boas’s first (1901) 
Columbia PhD (Kroeber) more than Boas himself did (Thoresen 1975).
Major Powell and the Bureau of American Ethnology
The “gentleman amateur,” engaged in fieldwork for a season or a short-
er time, already encountered in the AES, was “most prominent in de-
scriptive zoology and botany and in exploratory work in geography and 
geology,” according to Randall Collins (1975:487). Although John Wes-
ley Powell began his explorations of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado 
River as a professor of geology on a scientific expedition funded in part 
by his university, his early work fits that nonprofessional pattern, and 
the fruit of that first expedition was more journalistic adventure story 
than contribution to scientific knowledge (Stegner 1954:123). Powell was 
not primarily an anthropologist (and still less a linguist). He was a west-
ern explorer, “Washington scientific lion” (Scott 1976:27), and head of 
the Geological Survey of the Smithsonian Institution and, within it, of 
the Bureau of Ethnology, which he organized in 1879 (the name was 
specified to Bureau of American Ethnology in 1897). He was also presi-
dent for the first nine terms of its existence of the Anthropological So-
ciety of Washington, which was later to become the American 
Anthropological Association.
 As one of his successors recalled, of the collaborators he recruited to 
the BAE, “there’s not one of them had training in anthropology, because 
there was no place they could train. . . . When I first went into the field, 
there wasn’t a trained anthropologist in the whole lot. . . . Personal knowl-
edge and interest gained them information” (Hodge 1955:80, 197). Al-
though Powell lacked professional scientific training, built a staff of 
likewise self-taught scientists even in fields in which people with profes-
sional training were available, and was a major figure in amateur scien-
tific circles in Washington DC, he was very oriented toward Theory. In 
his view, necessary observation could be made by almost anyone. Sci-
entists such as himself then synthesized what amateurs reported (Hin-
sley 1981).
 The self-made ethnologists whom Powell gathered together shared 
an evolutionary perspective. Morgan’s (1877) Ancient Society and his view 
of unilinear evolution especially influenced Powell. While Social Dar-
Buy the Book
10 Part 1 Introduction
winism was immensely popular in late nineteenth-century America (Hof-
stader 1944), Powell did not become a Social Darwinist. He preferred 
the progressivist-guided evolutionary doctrine of his protégé Lester Frank 
Ward.3 While many of their contemporaries regarded the era of the rob-
ber barons as the inevitable pinnacle of human achievement, Powell and 
Ward stressed the role of intelligence and planning in human evolution—
and were, therefore, implacable critics of Spencer and his view of mind-
less social forces (see Commager 1967:193–224; Hinkle 1980:184–213). 
Bureau ethnologists did not follow intellectual developments in Europe 
closely: “The subjects at home were so vast that it took all the time and 
research, the American Indians,” as Hodge (1955:201) later rationalized.
 The central problematic for BAE ethnologists was the observed “anal-
ogies and homologies” between human groups, particularly in North 
America. Since mankind was “distributed throughout the habitable earth 
in some geological period anterior to the present” one—and also “ante-
rior to the development of organized speech”—what was common had 
to be accounted for by identical evolution (polygenesis) through fixed 
stages: “The individuals of one species, though inhabiting diverse com-
munities, have progressed in a broad way by the same stages, have had 
the same arts, customs, institutions, and traditions in the same order” 
(Powell 1881:80). As a methodological principle, Powell asserted, “all 
sound anthropological investigation in the lower states of culture exhib-
ited by tribes of men, as distinguished from nations, must have a firm 
foundation in language. Non-literate languages, representing a lower 
level of development, could profitably be studied with data from Native 
American tribes” (Powell 1881:xii–xv).
 Powell and his subordinates were preoccupied with ordering the cos-
mos—and cannot be accused of gathering unconnected facts. Orderly 
classification of phenomena from the American “Wild West,” such as 
Powell pressed for in geology, geography, hydrography, and ethnology, 
was useful to the government in Washington. Powell pioneered govern-
ment science and tied it to a valiant attempt to plan development of the 
West based on understanding of its aridity.4 Delineating Native Peoples 
was an administrative need of the federal government, responsible for 
their custody after the final expropriation of their lands (Holder 1966). 
Language was the obvious basis for groupings, so administrative needs 
and theoretical interests dovetailed.
 The BAE classification of North American native languages bears Pow-
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ell’s name, and Powell (1891:218) claimed “full responsibility” (if not 
actual authorship) for it. The work of ordering the data on the premise 
that grammar relates to the stage of evolutionary development of the 
speakers of a language and that “the grammatic structure or plan of a 
language is forever changing” (Powell 1891:88) was done by Henry Hen-
shaw, an ornithologist: “It was Henshaw who proposed and followed 
the biological method of linguistic stock precedence and nomenclature. 
. . . Powell was the moving spirit, and the final result, expedited by the 
approaching appearance of Brinton’s The American Race, was published 
in 1891, under Powell’s authorship but with credit to Henshaw in the 
Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau” (Darnell 1971:83–84).
 Powell created the BAE and organized the research to be done by oth-
ers whom he recruited. He also arranged for the dissemination of find-
ings. With Otis T. Mason, he founded the Anthropological Society of 
Washington. “The Society met twice a month, except in the summer, to 
hear from two to four scholarly papers. The papers read at these meet-
ings seldom languished unprinted, but usually appeared in the publica-
tions of the Smithsonian. . . . However, the need for a regular, official 
medium of publication was felt, and on Dec. 13, 1887, the Society became 
incorporated ‘for the term of one thousand years’ with the express pur-
pose of bringing out a magazine, and the first number of the American 
Anthropologist appeared in January 1888” (Hallowell 1960:94).
 If ever there was an organizational leader, it was Major Powell: “a ge-
nius at organization, [who] not only conceived a constructive program 
of research . . . but assembled the able men to carry it out” (Hallowell 
1960:93), found positions for them, published and/or synthesized the 
resulting research, and “established a tradition which gave high prior-
ity to linguistic studies” (33). Powell designated what research was valu-
able and tied together the theoretical implications of the work done by 
subordinates into theoretically driven classifications.
 The group that developed was not large. The number of full-time eth-
nologists in Powell’s scientific empire was few, arguably none. Those 
involved were recruited in their maturity rather than trained by Powell. 
A nonstudent group with access to publication did not produce “revo-
lutionary rhetoric.” While rejecting then-influential Spencerism, Powell 
and his colleagues embraced the theoretical schema of Morgan. Cele-
brating their own lack of professional training as a virtue, Powell and 
his followers made no provisions to train successors. Despite successful 
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institutionalization—in government and in a “professional” society—
the failure to train a new generation of workers resulted in the eventual 
eclipse of the Powell group and its paradigm by a university-based group.
Franz Boas
Though Boas and some of his students seem to have pushed the view 
that all was darkness until Franz Boas came to Clark University and said, 
“Let there be light,” the material above shows this to be myth. More-
over, some anthropologists, Leslie White in particular, consider that Boas 
brought darkness (theoretical nihilism) and obfuscation of evolutionary 
patterns where there had been light (from Morgan in particular).
 There is a vast literature on Boas, to which I have no interest in add-
ing.5 Not altogether advertently, he was central to relocating anthropo-
logical research from museums to universities. Quite advertently, he 
taught cohorts of cultural and linguistic anthropologists at Columbia 
University (where he was appointed in 1895) and established a paradigm 
of ethnographic particularism often focused on cultural traits (the infa-
mous “shreds and patches”). The research in this volume begins with 
the first generation of Boasians in fairly secure positions—inside the BAE 
as well as in new academic departments (the Berkeley one not initially 
a teaching department but turned into an important one by Alfred Kroe-
ber) and at least represented in the old one at Harvard.
 There was resistance to Boas’s domination of American anthropology, 
particularly from Harvard archeologists, and Boas was censured by the 
American Anthropological Association in 1919 for decrying U.S. spies 
posing as archeologists during the First World War, but his students ran 
the association’s journal, the American Anthropologist, and were embed-
ded in decisions by funders of anthropological research.
 Racial pseudoscience did not vanish but little of it emanated from 
American university anthropology departments (Harvard again provid-
ing an exception with sometimes spy for the U.S. government Carleton 
Coon). Theoretical discussions were between Boasians, as in the instance 
examined in the first chapter, though in classifying languages there was 
ongoing conflict between the splitter Boas and the lumper Edward Sa-
pir. The latter, Boas’s most prominent linguistic student, was also dubi-
ous about Boas’s exclusion of those without academic training in 
linguistics—and inclusion of some trained by Boas, matters I discuss in 
Theory Groups (Murray 1994b).
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 The “normal science” of trait distribution studies of memory cultures 
(salvage anthropology) was, in Boas’s own opinion, largely done, and I 
believe that he had no interest either in comparing the culture particu-
lars amassed (generally by “white room ethnography” elicitations, also 
called “debriefing elders”) or in attempting to try to make sense of North 
American prehistoric movements of peoples, cultural complexes, or cul-
ture traits. Boas claimed, “When I thought that these historical methods 
were firmly established I began to stress, about 1910[!], the problems of 
cultural dynamics, of integration of culture and of the interaction be-
tween individuals and society” (1940:311).
 Whether influenced by psychoanalysis or not (his students definitely 
were), a shift to the integration of culture in personalities was a para-
digm shift not brought on by rebels or revolutionaries but encouraged 
by Boas himself (see chapter 3; Darnell 1977). Similarly, established an-
thropologists (Alfred Kroeber, Robert Redfield, Lloyd Warner) rather 
than rebels or revolutionaries also encouraged expanding from study-
ing “primitives” to studying peasants (see chapter 3).
 Eventually there was an evolutionist counterrevolution in the decade 
leading up to the 1959 celebration of the centenary of the original pub-
lication of The Origin of Species. Some leading Boasians (Kroeber and 
Margaret Mead in particular) made this transition (led by Kroeber’s for-
mer student Julian Steward, who became chair of the Columbia anthro-
pology department in 1946 and trained many of the GI Bill generation 
of graduate students at Columbia). Later still, dissatisfaction with the 
failure to provide satisfactory explanations of change in term of “cul-
tural contact,” which was also the basis for history/”dynamics” within 
British social anthropology, led to comparative history, in the work of 
Steward’s student Eric Wolf (1969, 1982, 1999) and others, in terms of 
trade (including the slave trade) and conquests.
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Historical Inferences from Ethnohistorical Data
Boasian Views
Particularly under the stimulus of Jan Vansina (1965, 1986), the possi-
bility of using oral traditions to draw historical inferences regained le-
gitimacy within anthropology (see, for instance, K. Brown and Roberts 
1980). The earlier debate in which consideration of any historical value 
in such data shows a lack of agreement with the Boasian “band of sons,” 
a phenomenon also evident in the shock to the older sons about what 
intellectual daughters of “Papa Franz” did, is discussed in chapter 3.
The Cultural Elements Paradigm
Franz Boas, the prime mover both in the institutionalization of Ameri-
can anthropology and in overthrowing the paradigm of nineteenth-cen-
tury unilinear evolution theory, purported to view the distribution of 
cultural elements as not only a basis for reconstructing the history of 
societies without writing but as the only objective basis. During the first 
decade of the twentieth century, he directed his students to chart the 
geographical distribution of institutions, beliefs, and material objects 
from which to infer the migration of peoples and the diffusion of objects. 
He and they believed that the center of these scattergrams was the point 
of origin, that the peripheries where diffusion most recently had extend-
ed, and that the wider the distribution, the older the trait was. Sapir 
(1916) provided the most systematic account of the method for infer-
ring age from area (l distribution).
 Gathering data and refuting theories were more congenial to Boas than 
using data for the purposes for which they ostensibly were gathered. 
When his students began to draw inferences about prehistory, Boas did 
not support their efforts and shifted to another kind of particularistic 
study of single cultures, their psychic integration and reproduction. Nev-
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ertheless, those already pursuing the first Boasian “normal science,” the 
one in which they had been trained at the turn of the century, continued 
to try to solve the kinds of historical problems that were never seriously 
addressed by Boas or by his later students. Particularly in the project of 
salvaging memory cultures in California, Alfred Kroeber continued map-
ping cultural traits as reported by his students through the 1930s.
 John Reed Swanton and Roland Burrage Dixon were the first Boasians 
to affirm some historical kernel of truth within folk traditions. Both re-
ceived PhDs from Harvard, where Frederic Ward Putnam, a patron of 
both Boas and Kroeber, had established a center for anthropological re-
search. Both had taken courses at Columbia from Boas. Swanton would 
later aver: “Whatever I have done is due to the inspiration of our teach-
er, Boas” (Swanton:Robert Lowie, July 30, 1957). Dixon, like Boas a vet-
eran of the Jesup North Pacific Coast expeditions (see Freed and Freed 
1983), was interested in language family reconstruction. As Kroeber not-
ed in his obituary of Dixon, “Almost alone among their major contem-
poraries, he and Swanton maintained a sane and constructive interest 
in tribal and ethnic migration” (1923a:295).
 This was the enduring interest that motivated Swanton and Dixon at 
least to consider whether folk traditions might contain grains of history. 
In their 1914 survey of the continent’s prehistory they did not recom-
mend uncritical acceptance of such traditions as offering transparent 
history; indeed, they cautiously suggested, “In investigating still exist-
ing people like the American Indian we can appeal in the first place to 
their traditions, which, although sometimes noncommittal and frequent-
ly misleading, gain weight when recorded with other data” (Swanton 
and Dixon 1914:402).
 The far-from-wholesale endorsement was too much for the Machian 
positivist Robert Lowie, who was to succeed Swanton as editor of the 
American Anthropologist in 1923 and was, during the late teens, its book 
review editor. After claiming that “we are not concerned with the ab-
stract possibility of tradition preserving a knowledge of events, we want 
to know what historical conclusions may safely be drawn from given 
oral traditions in ethnological practice” (Lowie 1915:597), Lowie appealed 
to the exemplification of sound practice provided by attorney-folklorist 
E. Sidney Hartland (1914). Lowie then proceeded to do nothing other 
than lay down his absolutistic ban of any even “abstract possibility” of 
such use of oral tradition: “I cannot attach to oral tradition any histori-
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cal value whatsoever under any condition whatsoever. We cannot know 
them to be true except on the basis of extraneous evidence, and in that 
case they are superfluous, since linguistic, ethnological, or archeologi-
cal data suffice to establish the conclusion in question. . . . From the tra-
ditions themselves, nothing can be deduced” (1915:598).
 Dixon warned that “absolutely unqualified statements like that of Dr. 
Lowie’s are usually dangerous” (1915:599), while Swanton defended folk 
traditions about movements as revealing at least of the direction of mi-
grations. For Swanton (1915:601), an indicator that corroborated it in 
nine cases out of ten, when other evidence was available, could there-
fore be relied upon with some confidence in cases for which no other 
evidence was available. In Swanton’s pragmatic view, some data were 
better than no data, but for Lowie, “it is our duty to doubt till the facts 
compel us to affirm” (Lowie:Paul Radin, October 2, 1920), which for 
Lowie, as for Boas, was never.
 Boas’s Columbia-Barnard colleague Alexander Goldenweiser, irritat-
ed by Lowie’s attempted reductio ad absurdum in shifting from accept-
ing reports of the direction of migration to crediting everything in creation 
myths, joined the fray, noting, “Dr. Lowie does not strengthen his case 
by citing creation myths as proof of deficient historical sense of the In-
dians. Commonly enough, the Indians themselves distinguish between 
a myth and a historical tradition. But even were that not so, who would 
doubt the word of a woman who tells of having witnessed a child being 
run over by a street car solely on the ground of his knowledge that the 
woman believes in ghosts?” (1915:764).
 Goldenweiser also provided some less-colorful analogies:
Poor evidence is poor evidence, and the extent to which such evi-
dence can be trusted is determined by the probability of it being 
true evidence, which again may be estimated from the frequency 
of agreement between such evidence of an intrinsically higher mer-
it. Just as the physician is guided to his diagnosis of a disease by 
vague and doubtful symptoms until a positive one is forthcoming, 
just as the detective follows illusive and contradictory clues before 
establishing convincing proof of the crime, so the ethnologist in the 
absence of better evidence follows the lead of tradition until data 
of higher evidential value serve to confirm or refute his preliminary 
conjecture or hypothesis. (1915:763–64)
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 Lowie returned to his battle against native legends having any value 
as history with more straw men in his December 1916 address as outgo-
ing president of the American Folk-Lore Society (a publication he saw 
fit to reprint in his collection of his most important ethnological papers), 
such as “How can the historian beguile himself into the belief that he 
need only question the natives of a tribe to get at its history?” (Lowie 
1960:204) and issued another blanket rejection: “Indian tradition is his-
torically worthless, because the occurrences, possibly real, which it re-
tains are of no historical significance; and because it fails to record 
accurately, the most momentous happenings” (207).
 In 1916 Edward Sapir—who was, with Goldenweiser, a member of 
what Lowie considered the Boasian “super-intelligentsia” (1959:133)1 —
in laying out the age and area “hypothesis,” rebelled against the meth-
odological asceticism of Boas and Lowie.2 As in his own work on language 
classifications and phonemics (Sapir 1921a, 1925), Sapir preferred using 
imperfect data to throwing up his hands and not making historical in-
ferences. In regard to trait distribution, Sapir went beyond Dixon and 
Swanton to infer the sources (that is, which tribe originated the trait), 
not just direction of migration, from folklore.
 Lowie did not want to review Sapir’s book but, having failed to get ei-
ther Boas or Kroeber to do it, undertook the task. When his evaluation 
reached Sapir’s discussion of “native testimony,” Lowie produced an 
odd introduction: “Dr. Sapir’s position with reference to certain moot 
questions is of interest” (1919:76). Considering that Lowie’s own posi-
tion had recently been attacked in the profession’s core journal by four 
of his elders, including the journal’s editor, “moot questions” is quite 
bold a definition of the situation! Besides which, I wonder how any an-
swer to a “moot question” can be of interest. (Perhaps the word was un-
derstood differently a century ago?)
 Just as he used creation myths to dismiss limited inferences about 
population movement in attacking Swanton and Dixon, Lowie set up a 
Sapirian straw man. Rather than multiple tribes agreeing that some oth-
er tribe invented something, Lowie switched to a hypothetical case in 
which each tribe claimed to have originated the trait and sententiously 
concluded that “the fact that one of them must be correct does not es-
tablish the methodological validity of accepting native traditions as his-
tory” (1919:76).
 This account, internal to American anthropology (and, indeed, to the 
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American Anthropologist), does not consider the extent to which both 
Boas and Lowie had been doing battle against German diffusionism 
theories, as most completely crystallized in Graebner (1911). Boas rare-
ly cited anyone, but he not only reviewed Graebner’s magnum opus very 
negatively but also reprinted his 1911 review from Science in his collec-
tion of his major publications, Race, Language, and Culture (Boas 
1940:295–304). Lowie devoted a presentation at the 1911 annual meet-
ing of the American Folk-Lore Society (published in its journal: Lowie 
1913) to attacking the assumptions (and “premature classification” of 
similarities in culture traits) in Graebner’s magnum opus of a concep-
tion of mechanical cultural transmission in positing historical transmis-
sion of cultural traits (also noted by Boas, whom Lowie did not mention 
in this connection).
Aftermath
Although Lowie’s critique came down (at least in the lore of the field, at 
least as far as the 1970s) as refutation (in the full Popperian sense) of 
pseudohistorical methods, closer examination of the whole exchange 
(or two exchanges) shows that Lowie’s dogmatic condemnation of eth-
nohistorical data fit with the antihistorical wave of the future (ca. 1920) 
of American anthropology (functionalism, structuralism, culture and 
personality). It is not that Lowie refuted Swanton and Dixon, only that 
interests turned away from history of any sort in general and trait dis-
tributions in particular (as Lowie 1955:120 recognized). The lack of at-
tention to such evidence in the following decades has less to do with the 
cogency of Lowie’s criticisms than with a shift from historical recon-
struction to ahistorical work on modal personalities in intact cultures 
and synchronic fieldwork focused on social organization.
 After completing his combination of linguistic stocks into protofam-
ilies (see Sapir 1921a; Darnell 1971, 1990a), Sapir was at the forefront of 
“culture and/in personality” theorizing (see Darnell 1990a, 1998b; La-
Barre 1958:280–81) and arranged for the main carrier to North America 
of ahistorical functionalism, A. R. Radcliffe Brown, to come to the Uni-
versity of Chicago (see chapter 10; Sapir:Louis Wirth, November 25, 1931). 
Lowie would eventually write a national character study (Lowie 1954) 
and a social organization textbook (Lowie 1948). Yet, at the end of his 
career, he would recollect, “It was the reconstruction of the ancient prim-
itive life that interested me” (Lowie 1959:169), despite his part in mak-
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ing such work seem neither possible nor worth doing (especially in 
Lowie 1937).
 As already mentioned, staggering under the responsibility of salvag-
ing knowledge about numerous California tribes (of considerable lan-
guage family diversity), Kroeber persisted in collecting checklists of 
culture elements into the 1930s. By statistical analyses of data gathered 
by sometimes unenthusiastic students, Kroeber and Harold Driver sought 
to draw inferences about diffusion and to correlate cultural and envi-
ronmental areas long after Boas had decreed the study of diffusion end-
ed, and after even Clark Wissler had given it up.
 Competing with his Berkeley colleague Frederick Teggart (see chap-
ter 13), Kroeber continued historical correlations on a grand scale (A. 
Kroeber 1944 was his magnum opus); after World War II Kroeber (1955, 
1961) championed Maurice Swadesh’s development of a new mechani-
cal discovery procedure for genetic reconstruction of languages, lexico-
statisics (see Murray 1994b:207–11).
 Above I quoted Kroeber writing that only Swanton and Dixon main-
tained an interest in tribal migration. Dixon’s interests shifted from Na-
tive America to Polynesia (see Dixon 1916, 1928). Swanton continued 
careful sifting of whatever could be recovered from explorers’ accounts 
(notably, Swanton 1932) and Native American traditions (Swanton 1930, 
1942, 1952). Lowie recurrently used Swanton’s work on the lack of clans 
in some American Indian tribes to refute evolutionary schema and pre-
sented it as the prime exemplar of Boasian ethnology in The History of 
Ethnological Theory (Lowie 1937:145).
 And for my generation (and later ones), interest in the possibility of 
lore containing some valid knowledge (of history, or herbal remedies, 
and so forth) revived, along with scrutiny of accounts of vanished or 
greatly modified cultures made by nonprofessional (and still suspect) 
observers (the whole field of ethnohistory).
 For the history of American anthropology, who won in either the short 
or the long run is less important than is revealing the quite heated dis-
agreement within the fraternity (which it still was in 1915–20) of Boasian 
anthropologists. Boas’s discomfort with Sapir’s lumping of language 
families (from the profusion of the “Powell classification”) and the dis-
comfort of the first generation of Boasians with the methods of the lat-
er generation—most especially Margaret Mead, with her “vigorous 
omniscience” and lack of command of the languages of the people about 
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whom she pronounced—are better known (the latter is discussed in chap-
ter 3). And almost immediately following the dustup over migration ac-
counts, there was a better-remembered conflict between Kroeber (1917, 
1918) advocating considering only “superorganic” phenomena and Sa-
pir (1917) defending psychology (no particular psychology, but the indi-
vidual as the locus of cultural analysis).
 I think that “Boasian paradigm” is a meaningful locution, though those 
trained after the First World War were pointed at other problematics 
than those that their elders had been aimed at. Boas remained a nihilist 
about drawing conclusions and even making generalizations. He may 
have taught (old-fashioned for the day) statistical methods, but he strikes 
me as having been incapable of thinking statistically, continuing to search 
for a single counterinstance to “invalidate” any purported pattern across 
space or time.
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